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Game Theory Evolving is a multifaceted work. It is a critique of the current state of economic game theory, a survey of some of its literature, a vast compendium of exercises interlaced with snippets of theory, a showcase for the author's approach to modelling behaviour and an opportunity for him to tell jokes. According to the author, the book is unified by six simple ideas about game theory, namely, that (1) learning it means learning how to solve a variety of sophisticated problems; it is (2) a universal language for the unification of the behavioural sciences and (3) a tool for investigating the world; it is about (4) how people cooperate as much as how they compete and (5) the emergence, transformation, diffusion and stabilization of forms of behaviour; (6) it is adventure and fantasy. Perhaps one can learn from game theory about the world as from fiction about life. In any event, there are numerous mythical creatures (e.g. klingons, snarks, trogs and economists with reputations worth a billion dollars).
As a critique of the status quo, the book is convincing and thoroughly compelling, at least in part because the author tends not to mince words. For example: 'When the same object of knowledge is modeled in different ways, the models should agree where they overlap . . . This principle has been routinely violated in the social sciences . . . This is a great scandal, and game theory is an important tool for moving beyond it ' (pp. 239-240) .
A recurring theme is that game theory's most fundamental predictions are often 'decisively and repeatedly disconfirmed', but only because economists have yet to abandon the so-called 'rational actor' or Homo economicus model of humans, which presumes among other things that individuals are capable of ratiocination by 'backward induction' from a distant future round of play to the present one. But more or less recent results from experimental game theory show that people rarely backwardinduct for more than a few rounds. Furthermore, people 'appear to have higher discount rates over payoffs in the near future than in the distant future . . . often have inconsistent preferences over lotteries and cannot apply the laws of probability consistently without extensive formal training . . . and are sensitive to changes from the status quo' (page 245). In these respects they contradict assumptions of standard models. A related theme is that 'low probability events are evolutionarily unimportant,' so that game-theoretical solution concepts presupposing optimal play at such events can readily lead to absurdity. Another theme is that markets do not clear in strategic equilibrium, especially for contracts between a moneysupplying 'principal' (e.g. an employer, a lender or a customer) and an effort-promising 'agent' (e.g. an employee, a borrower or a firm) whose actual effort is unobservable by the principal (equilibrium being maintained with an excess supply of agents by the principal's 'trigger' strategy of threatening nonrenewal for agents who don't keep their promises). Broadly speaking, in every case the author argues that more new models are badly needed. He makes a special pitch for principal-agent models, and, as an antidote to Homo economicus, he offers both Homo egualis (the strength of whose urge to reduce inequality decreases with personal privilege) and Homo reciprocans (who has a propensity both to cooperate and to punish noncooperators, even at personal cost).
Despite a biological emphasis in the chapter on signalling games, the book is biased towards contributions to game theory by economists, and thus away from those by biologists and mathematicians, especially recent ones (e.g. Dugatkin & Reeve 1998; Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998; Mesterton-Gibbons 2000) . The bias runs counter to the author's conviction that economists 'have much to learn from primates, birds, termites, and even dung beetles and pond scum' about human sociality, but it will probably increase the novelty of the material to biologists seeking a wider perspective on game theory, and hence also its appeal. Nevertheless, an unfortunate consequence is that in developing his concept of 'strong reciprocity' in the context of Homo reciprocans, the author overlooks Wilson's (1980) pivotal work on trait group selection.
As an introduction to game theory, the book is suffused with both the lore of economics and the language of its ancillary mathematics. The preface is followed by Suggestions for Instructors (in economics); but there is no
